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The introduction of the euro was intended to integrate mar-
kets within Europe further, after the implementation of the
1992 Single Market Project. We examine the extent to which
this objective has been achieved, by examining the degree of
price dispersion between countries in the euro zone, compared
to a control group of EU countries outside the euro zone. We
also establish the role of exchange rate risk in hampering ar-
bitrage by estimating the euro eﬀect for subgroups within the
euro zone, utilizing diﬀerences among EU countries in partici-
pation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Our results, in con-
trast with previous empirical research, suggest robustly that
the euro has had a signiﬁcant integrating eﬀect.
JEL Codes: E31, E42, F01.
Over the past two decades, markets within the European Union
(EU) have become progressively more integrated as internal barri-
ers to trade have been dismantled. Two crucial steps in this process
were the completion of the Single Market Project in 1992 and the
start of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. The ﬁrst
removed the remaining physical, administrative, and technical bar-
riers to integration and stimulated competition. The second intro-
duced a common currency and eliminated exchange rate variations
∗We are grateful to Eurostat for providing the data analyzed in this paper.
Eurostat bears no responsibility for the analysis and conclusions reported here.
We should like to thank an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier ver-
sion, but remain responsible for any errors or omissions. Corresponding author:
Kattuman, e-mail: p.kattuman@jbs.cam.ac.uk.
73
74 International Journal of Central Banking December 2005
between the eleven (later twelve) members of the euro zone.1 In the
widely quoted and inﬂuential report “One Market, One Money,” the
European Commission (1990) argued that “without a completely
transparent and sure rule of the law of one price for tradable goods
and services, which only a single currency can provide, the sin-
gle market cannot be expected to yield its full beneﬁts—static and
dynamic.” The single currency would deepen integration by lower-
ing exchange-rate-risk premia, lower uncertainty, make cross-border
business much more proﬁtable, and lower transaction costs, thereby
saving the equivalent of approximately 1 percent of EU15 GDP.
This viewpoint was reiterated in the 1996 review of the single
market: “increased price transparency will enhance competition and
whet consumer appetites for foreign goods; price discrimination be-
tween diﬀerent national markets (in the EU) will be reduced” (Euro-
pean Commission 1996). When the euro actually became an account-
ing reality in 1999, the European Commission (1999) anticipated that
it would “squeeze price dispersion in EU markets.”
The recent publication of a newly revised, consistent, and com-
prehensive data set on price indices for the period from 1995 has
made it possible to undertake a detailed analysis of price convergence
within the EU. We test the hypothesis that greater market integra-
tion, followed by a common currency, has rendered the Law of One
Price (LOOP) valid for the EU. Our results robustly suggest that
the euro has had a positive eﬀect on price convergence for tradable
goods, among EMU members relative to non-EMU members, over
and above a general EU-wide tendency towards price convergence. It
is also evident that risk, due to volatility of nominal exchange rates
prior to the introduction of EMU, has had a signiﬁcant bearing on
the process of price convergence.
The structure of this paper is as follows. An overview of the rel-
evant theory and the empirical literature is provided in section 1,
including the beneﬁts derived from a single currency. Section 2
describes the data and section 3 discusses the methodology used.
Section 4 reports the results of our analysis. Conclusions are oﬀered
in section 5.
1The 1999 members were Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Greece joined in
2001.
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1. Theory and Literature
1.1 Theory
In the international economics literature, the LOOP and its aggre-
gate counterpart, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), have provided a
useful benchmark for the dynamics of relative prices. The Law of
One Price states that prices of identical tradable goods priced in
the same currency should, under competitive conditions, be equal
across all locations, national and international. If prices diﬀer, then
arbitrageurs, subject to certain threshold eﬀects, would proﬁt from
buying the goods where they are comparatively cheap and selling
them where they are comparatively expensive. The price of nontrad-
able goods, normally excluded from the LOOP analysis, can also
be expected to converge, with a suﬃciently high degree of economic
integration.
From a theoretical point of view, the failure of LOOP, and hence
of PPP, has several explanations. In a common market like the EU,
where tariﬀs, trade quotas, and other informal barriers have been
removed, one obvious reason that remains would be transport costs.
Shipping costs permit price diﬀerentials between more distant mar-
kets without encouraging arbitrage. In a seminal article, Engel and
Rogers (1996) found that distance, as a convenient control for trans-
port costs, explains relative price dispersion across ten U.S. and nine
Canadian cities; this result has been conﬁrmed by Parsley and Wei
(1996 and 2001), Cecchetti, Nelson, and Sonora (1999), and more re-
cently by Haskel and Wolf (2001). Engel and Rogers also reveal that
the border eﬀect is more decisive than distance, even when both
countries share the same language and similar cultural and politi-
cal traditions. They speculate that the EU could also be aﬀected by
similar border eﬀects, and Beck and Weber (2003) report evidence
for this.
The segmentation of countries by borders creates the potential for
monopoly pricing, and Feuerstein (2003) showed that ﬁrms could ex-
ploit markets exhibiting a home-product bias by setting higher prices
in domestic markets than in export markets. Also, national variations
in consumer preferences can, in general, foster price discrimination
across countries. To the extent cross-border search costs are likely to
be higher than their domestic counterparts, ﬁnding price dispersion
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across Europe will not be surprising. Technological advances such as
Internet price search engines should erode these information barriers
over time, but Baye et al. (forthcoming)—analyzing prices of a selec-
tion of homogenous goods sold via Internet price listing services—
found that, in fact, price dispersion within EMU countries increased,
relative to price dispersion within non-EMU countries, after the
introduction of the euro.
Another explanation suggests that highly traded goods contain
signiﬁcant nontraded components and this frustrates price conver-
gence (Rogoﬀ 1996). Consumer prices include the price of the prod-
uct itself, but also imputed rents, shipping costs, labor costs, and
insurance premiums from nontraded goods. These cost factors may
aﬀect the prices of nontraded intermediate goods and thereby have
an impact on the degree of price dispersion for traded ﬁnal goods.
Exchange rate risk can also raise costs of cross-country arbitrage.
An arbitrageur buying high-priced products in, say, Sweden, with
the intention of selling them in the United Kingdom, faces the risk
that proﬁts are eliminated through exchange rate movements before
the goods have been sold. The risk would be higher if long-term
investments are necessary for seizing potential arbitrage opportuni-
ties, because exchange rate hedges with maturity dates longer than
one year are hard to obtain (HM Treasury 2003). Price dispersion
between homogeneous tradable goods could arise due to transac-
tion costs involved in cross-border payment, currency conversion, or
settlement delay.
Finally, arbitrage by consumers might be hampered by the lack
of price transparency. Although comparisons of prices between coun-
tries need only basic calculations, the psychological eﬀect of using a
diﬀerent yardstick could be large and potentially inhibiting. Money
illusion cannot be ruled out, according to Fehr and Tyran (2001),
but whether this applies in a single-currency context is debatable.
1.1.1 The Beneﬁts of a Common Currency
A common currency eliminates transaction costs and exchange rate
risks and, through price transparency, increases trade and competi-
tion, thereby contributing to lower price dispersion after adjusting
for transport costs. Price convergence in turn further strengthens
trade and competition in a two-way reinforcing process. In a series of
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controversial papers, Rose (2000, 2002) and jointly with van Wincoop
(2001) and Glick (2001) established that countries with the same
currency traded with each other twice as much as those with dif-
ferent currencies.2 And Micco, Stein, and Ordon˜ez (2003) provided
evidence that the introduction of the euro increased trade among the
members of the single currency and also those that remained outside,
although the 8–16 percent increase in volume terms falls way short
of the estimates of Rose.3
Beck and Weber (2003) attributed the failure of the LOOP to ex-
change rate volatility that impedes price convergence, and Goldberg
and Verboven (2004) demonstrated that such volatility contributed
signiﬁcantly to price dispersion in the European car market. But
they argued that the EU could facilitate price convergence for cars
by removing restrictions on competition that had previously been
sanctioned by the European Commission as a concession to man-
ufacturers. The threat of new entrants into the domestic market
and hence greater competition would put downward pressure on
producers’ prices (Freeman 1995).
Price convergence could also be stimulated by a common mon-
etary policy and more particularly in the nontraded goods sector
through the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis (1964).4 Furthermore,
Eleftheriou (2003) found that euro-zone countries (including Greece,
Portugal, and Spain) for which the common interest rate was inap-
propriately low, were also poorer countries with low relative price
levels. A low common interest rate led to an above-EMU average
inﬂation rate (“catch-up inﬂation”) in these countries and thus to
price convergence. The predictive power of the common interest rate
in terms of future inﬂation rates has proved to be surprisingly robust
(Honohan and Lane 2003).
The EMU has the potential to remove exchange rate risk, trans-
action costs, and the veil over price transparency. While price
2The relationship between market integration and the volume of trade would
not be monotonic.
3Rose’s results have been challenged by, among others, Persson (2001) and
Me´litz (2001).
4Converging and higher productivity levels in the traded goods sector may
raise output and wages, and these wage increases may spill over into the low-
productivity nontraded sector, fueling inﬂation. Productivity gains are higher in
the low-priced countries, and their faster rising nontraded goods prices may force
the country’s prices to converge upward.
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convergence will be stimulated, price dispersion will remain to a
greater or lesser degree. United States’ price convergence has been
used as a predictor for the EU, given their similar size, structure,
and culture, although the EU has more languages. Begg et al. (2001)
found substantially lower price dispersion in the United States than
in the EU and concluded that the potential for price convergence in
the EU remained large (but see Matha¨ 2003; Rogers 2001 and 2002).
1.2 Empirical Evidence
Sifting the evidence on price convergence pre- and post-EMU re-
quires a great deal of care. This stems from the diﬀerent method-
ologies employed by researchers as well as empirical issues such as
diﬀerences in data sources; whether countries or cities, or single com-
modities or multiproduct groups, are the focus, and whether appro-
priate controls were used. In practice, data quality and availability
frame the hypothesis that can be tested. The results from previous
research that encompasses EMU have been summarized in table 1 in
the appendix and these are assessed below. Eleven studies oﬀer the
most germane comparison with our own work, two of which found a
positive euro eﬀect, ﬁve a mixed euro eﬀect, and four a negative or
no euro eﬀect.
1.2.1 Positive or Mixed Euro Eﬀect
National borders prevent prices from converging as Rose (2002) and
others have shown. Extending that analysis, Beck and Weber (2003)
in their study of eighty-one cities and ten categories of goods over
the period 1991–2002 found that crossing a border was equivalent to
adding seventy-four miles to the distance between cities. That was
a much lower ﬁgure than previous researchers had found, and—of
greater signiﬁcance—they report that intranational price dispersion
fell by 80 percent after the introduction of the euro. Isgut (2002) an-
alyzed two balanced panels of 116 cities and 69 goods and 79 cities
and 123 goods in 2001 and concluded that the same currency reduces
price diﬀerences generally by 2–3 percent (using standard deviations
of log price diﬀerences across city pairs) and in the EMU speciﬁ-
cally, by 5 percent, even when EU had been controlled for. Friberg
and Matha¨ (2004) examined price convergence immediately after the
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introduction of the euro using data on ninety-two supermarket prod-
ucts sold in Luxembourg and four contiguous regions, taking into
account psychological pricing (pricing just below a round number of
euros, typically ending 0.95 or 0.75) and found greater convergence
in psychological prices than in fractional prices.
Five studies found mixed results. In an extensive analysis of
eighty-three cities and ninety-ﬁve commodities over the period 1990–
2000, Parsley and Wei (2001) found 4.3 percent lower price dispersion
following EMU and that the Belgium-Luxembourg currency union
had 8 percent lower price dispersion. They estimate that this result
equates to a drop in tariﬀs of 4 percent (the eﬀect of any currency
union is one order of magnitude more important than the fall in ex-
change rate volatility). But once EU membership is controlled for,
the EMU eﬀect is no longer found to be signiﬁcant. In a more re-
stricted analysis of economic regions contiguous with Luxembourg,
Matha¨ (2003) examined ninety-two supermarket products at four
dates in 2001 and 2002 and showed that monetary union led to price
convergence, except that as distance increased, prices rose by 0.025
percent. However, the products were sold at diﬀerent supermarkets
and might not be strictly comparable. He predicted that the smaller
distances across Europe in comparison with the United States indi-
cate that price convergence in the EU has much further to go.
Lutz (2004) compared the long-standing Belgium-Luxembourg
currency union with the rest of the EU to determine whether the
currency union had generated higher levels of price convergence for
ninety car models over the period 1993–98. He reports a 4 percent
lower price diﬀerential within the currency union even when the
other determinants of economic integration had been controlled. In
an earlier study, Lutz (2003) had included a smaller sample of cars
(seventeen models), but also The Economist magazine, Big Macs
R©
,
and data on thirteen categories of goods collected by UBS over a
thirty-year period ending in 2000. He had only one post-EMU date to
measure any euro eﬀect on a small commodity sample. Price conver-
gence could be found for The Economist, but no signiﬁcant euro eﬀect
could be identiﬁed for any of the others. Finally, Imbs et al. (2004)
looked at the price of television sets in twelve EU and three east-
ward enlargement countries for the period 1999–2002. They found
price dispersion to be lower in the EMU countries, although most of
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this convergence had occurred before the introduction of the single
currency.
1.2.2 Negative or No Euro Eﬀect
A number of macroeconomic studies have looked at the impact
of the Single Market Project on price convergence. Rogers (2002)
found that most of the convergence (in his study of 139 commodities
in twenty-ﬁve EU cities) occurred before 1994, with the EU level
close to that found in the United States. Of more relevance to us
is his study with Engel (2004) that assessed 101 narrowly deﬁned
tradable goods and 38 nontraded goods in eighteen cities in eleven
EU countries, using seven non-EU countries as a control, over the
period 1990–2002/3. They conﬁrm the earlier result, but now found
that the price dispersion for tradables had somewhat perversely in-
creased after EMU and that the result applied to those countries
outside the euro zone as well as to those inside the zone.
In a microeconomic study of 150 car models in ﬁve EU countries
(one non-EMU) over the period 1970–2000, Goldberg and Verboven
(2004) report converging prices between 1990 and 1992, but diver-
gence thereafter, speciﬁcally in the United Kingdom and in Italy. Fi-
nally, in the ﬁrst study of Internet prices, Baye et al. (forthcoming)
collected the weekly prices of twenty-eight mostly electronic prod-
ucts during 2001 and 2002 from a price comparison site (Kelkoo)
for seven countries, including four in the euro zone. Although the
EU had lower price dispersion than the United States for compara-
ble goods, by 2002 the goods were priced 10 percent higher in the
euro-zone countries than they were in the non-euro-zone ones.
1.2.3 Relevance of the Findings
What importance should be placed on these ﬁndings? Firstly, they
are mostly noncomparable and present a series of snapshot pictures
of price convergence or divergence over diﬀerent periods and across
diﬀerent countries and cities, although all include data that strad-
dle the introduction of the euro. To the extent they use diﬀerent
data sets and methodologies, they do not build up any evolving pic-
ture of changes in price dispersion over time. Analysis of city data
is of concern, since it often relates to prices in capital cities that are
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unrepresentative of the whole country. This criticism aﬀects many
of the studies, including Parsley and Wei (2001), Beck and Weber
(2003), and Engel and Rogers (2004). In testing LOOP, it is unsat-
isfactory that unit value studies cannot use identical commodities,
or product categories that are standardized. Quality diﬀerences can
bias results. The results from single products such as The Economist
or Big Macs
R©
, while interesting, are too limited to be generalizable.
This paper employs a consistent series of country-level compar-
ative price indices for a large number of product groups. Unlike
most of the other studies, it includes four post-EMU date points.
We ﬁnd that the earlier harmonization eﬀect from economic integra-
tion and the macroeconomic policy convergence eﬀect had not been
fully played out in the run up to the euro, and that there was a
signiﬁcant euro eﬀect.
2. Data
2.1 Data Description
2.1.1 Data Collection and Categorization
The data used for our empirical analysis were provided by Eurostat.
The data contain comparative price level (CPL) indices for individual
consumption expenditure5 in 200 product groups for the ﬁfteen EU
countries over the period 1995–2002.6 The group categorization fol-
lows the United Nations “Classiﬁcation of Individual Consumption
According to Purpose.”7 The data were published on December 18,
2003, based on the European System of Accounts, 1995 (ESA95) reg-
ulation revision.8 This is the most disaggregated level at which data
is currently held by Eurostat. The revision makes the data compa-
rable across the period 1995–2002, whereas previously this was only
possible for either the period pre-1999 or post-1999.
5Retail prices including VAT.
6Eurostat uses the term “comparative price level” rather than relative price
level to signify that price levels are comparable between countries at a deﬁned
level of aggregation.
7For details, see United Nations Statistics Division, http://unstats.un.org/
unsd/cr/family2.asp?Cl=5.
8Commission Regulation (EC) 2223/1996 of June 25, 1996; see Eurostat
(2003a).
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The prices of consumer goods and services are collected by Eu-
rostat in cooperation with the national statistical agencies for the
Eurostat-OECD comparison program every three years. Data are
gathered for all goods and services at six collection dates, one every
half year (using a rolling benchmark approach). Prices in between the
three-year collections are extrapolated with the respective monthly
consumer price index. The data are used to construct a PPP series
for the products, i.e., ratios of prices denoted in respective currencies.
The notion of comparing “identical” products is constrained
by consumption patterns in the relevant countries. For example, a
mainstream product sold in supermarkets with a low retail price in
Germany might only exist as a niche product with a high retail price
in the United Kingdom. Eurostat attempts to ensure that the se-
lected products are commonly found in as many participating coun-
tries as possible, but they do not necessarily have to be available in
all the countries (Eurostat 2003b).
Among the 200 product groups, 39 are so-called reference PPPs,
for which no data are collected directly (e.g., services of general prac-
titioners, heat energy, and life insurance). Their value is imputed en-
tirely from other included product groups, and so they are excluded
from our analysis. The scope of our analysis is given in table 2 in
the appendix. The data allow a distinction between tradables and
nontradables, shown in the column labeled “Category.” From the 161
product groups with good quality data, 115 tradable products can be
identiﬁed. Nontradables are categorized into low and high sunk-cost
products in order to test the hypothesis that low sunk-cost products
may converge faster due to lower barriers for arbitrage. Tradables
can likewise be separated into broader categories of product groups,
which are less or more tradable (e.g., perishable and nonperishable
foods). The distinction is shown in table 3 in the appendix.
Greece has been excluded from the analysis, because it did not
join the EMU in 1999 and treating it as a non-EMU member would
bias the non-EMU group for 2001 and 2002.
2.1.2 Computations of the Comparative Price Level Series
The PPP series that reﬂects the CPL is constructed by aggregating
bilateral price comparisons of baskets of similar goods and services.
A bilateral PPP exchange rate represents the hypothetical exchange
Vol. 1 No. 3 One Market, One Money, One Price? 83
rate that would be necessary to equalize price levels between two
countries. The aggregation of the PPP series produces a set of PPP
exchange rates relative to the EU average.9 The annual CPL indices
are computed as a ratio of the respective PPP exchange rate over
the annual average of the respective nominal exchange rate, e, as
shown in equation (1) for country c:
CPLc/EU =
PPPc/EU
ec/EU
· 100 (1)
The CPL series can be used to test whether PPP holds, in which
case the CPL equals 100, i.e., the ratio of the price levels equals the
nominal exchange rate. Thus, deviations of a country’s CPL index
from the EU average (that always equals 100) provide information
about the price level of the country relative to the EU. A CPL index
of 105 indicates a price level of 5 percent above the EU average.10
A general feature of the CPL series is the diﬀering importance
of the PPP and of the nominal exchange rate in movements of the
CPL index. Figure 1 shows the UK CPL and the nominal £/€ ex-
change rate over time. The example indicates that the CPL series
is dominated by changes in the nominal exchange rate. It might be
argued that the analysis of price convergence could be distorted by
large movements in the exchange rate. However, when analyzing the
EMU eﬀect, it does not matter whether price convergence is achieved
by changes in PPP or in the nominal exchange rate.
2.2 The Advantage and Disadvantage of the Data
Eurostat CPL series have been used in previous studies, e.g., HM
Treasury (2003) and Sosvilla-Rivero and Gil-Pareja (2004). The ad-
vantage of using aggregated data is the highly representative nature
of the information. Eurostat data have been collected for an ade-
quate sample of goods (as discussed in section 2.1.1). This permits
9The price ratios are aggregated into the matrix of bilateral Fisher indices
and made transitive by the Elteto-Ko¨ves-Szulc (EKS) method. For the aggrega-
tion, expenditure weights of the respective product groups are applied (Eurostat
2003b). The resulting CPL indices enable comparison between countries at the
same level of aggregation, given that the EKS formula is nonadditive.
10Table 4 in the appendix provides an overview of the national CPL indices
across time.
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Figure 1. The UK CPL National Average Across All
Product Categories Against the Annual Average of the
Nominal £/€ Exchange Rate between 1995 and 2002
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Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
the determination of more general patterns, as opposed to studies
focusing on a single product (e.g., Big Mac
R©
series) or small product
sets.
At the same time, valuable information is potentially lost by ag-
gregation. Price deviations with opposite signs in a basket of prod-
ucts could cancel each other out. This would introduce a downward
aggregation bias, thereby understating the actual level of price dis-
persion. The eﬀect of the bias on the analysis is indeterminate, since
it could potentially aﬀect the price dispersion of both the EMU and
the non-EMU group, at diﬀerent times.
The relatively short time period covered by the data set could
inter alia signiﬁcantly reduce the precision of the regression analy-
sis, but here we are constrained by Eurostat’s revision exercise for
pre-1999 data. On the other hand, while Rogers (2001) and Beck
and Weber (2003), among others, use data from the Economist In-
telligence Unit (EIU), which provides data only for European cities,
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Eurostat collects prices in a large number of cities to attain repre-
sentative national comparative prices.
3. Modeling
In determining whether EMU signiﬁcantly reduced price dispersion,
the challenge arises from the impossibility of confronting the ob-
served data with a counterfactual, i.e., price convergence in the euro
zone without the euro. This necessitates a “second-best” strategy to
reveal the EMU eﬀect. The following section describes a tailored
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) model using EMU-related dummy
variables as explanatory variables.
3.1 Measuring Price Dispersion
Price dispersion can be measured in various ways, e.g., as a range of
minimum to maximum price, as a standard deviation (SD) across
prices, or as a coeﬃcient of variation (CV). The range is a less
suitable measure, because it is aﬀected by the extreme values and
does not reﬂect average price dispersion. With CPL indices the
latter two are equivalent for an EU-wide analysis, since the EU
mean (µEU ) is always 100.11 For subsets of the EU (e.g., non-
EMU countries), it is likely that µnon−EMU = µEU , and therefore
SDnon−EMU = CVnon−EMU . In order to avoid scale eﬀects, the CV
rather than the SD is used in the following analysis.
In computing the CV, its components—SD and mean—are com-
puted for each country grouping (e.g., the EMU group, the non-EMU
group, and so on). No expenditure weights for the countries are used,
since the potential for arbitrage is expected to arise irrespectively of
the size of a country. The analysis therefore calibrates convergence
toward group means, not the EU mean of 100, because the euro is
expected to reduce arbitrage costs for intra-EMU trade rather than
EU-wide trade.
Figure 2 depicts the CV of the EMU and non-EMU groups. The
EMU group displays a lower degree of price dispersion only un-
til 1997; the CV of the non-EMU group fell at a faster rate until
11The CV of group i with SDi and µi is deﬁned as CVi =
S D i
µ i
·100; if µi = 100,
as in the case of an EU-wide analysis, then CVi = SDi .
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Figure 2. The CV of National CPL for the Respective
Country Groups Over Time
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2000. But the trend reversal that has been observed since 2000 may
indicate a euro eﬀect on price convergence.
3.2 Quantifying the Euro Eﬀect
A simple comparison of price dispersion among EMU members before
the introduction of the euro and in the post-euro period does not
help very much since it presumes that there were no events beyond
the euro that aﬀected price dispersion post-1999: potential eﬀects on
price dispersion by advances in transportation or the Internet, for
example, are not taken into account. The restrictive nature of this
assumption increases over time, when further data points should give
greater certainty to the analysis.
Likewise, simple cross-section comparisons of the country group-
ings that attribute the diﬀerence in price dispersion between EMU
and non-EMU groups for the post-1999 period to the euro would
also rest on the strong, unwarranted assumption that there are no
structural diﬀerences between EMU and non-EMU countries.
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3.3 The Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences Approach
These drawbacks can be resolved to a large extent by the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences (DD) approach, which has been used for estimating the
EMU eﬀect with a diﬀerent data set by Lutz (2003).12 “The basic
intuition of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach is that to study
the impact of some ‘treatment,’ one compares the performance of the
treatment group pre- and post-treatment relative to the performance
of some control group pre- and post-treatment” (Slaughter 2001).
In our case, the DD method is useful in revealing the diﬀerence
in the rate of price convergence after the introduction of the euro.
The model’s assumption is less restrictive: after the introduction of
the euro, there are no other factors that aﬀect the EMU and non-
EMU groups diﬀerently.
3.3.1 Analysis of the Model
The DD approach is as shown in equation (2), where the subscripts
g, p, and t denote the country group,13 the product group,14 and
the time period,15 respectively. The EMU dummy takes a value of
one or zero depending on whether a country belongs to the treat-
ment or the control group, respectively. The post99 dummy becomes
one when t ≥ 1999 and remains zero otherwise. The time trend τ
takes a value of one to eight for the respective time period. Γ assem-
bles a set of three control variables, Θ represents the set of prod-
uct ﬁxed eﬀects, and  is the residual term with the usual desirable
properties.
12Panel unit root and co-integration techniques have also been used to test
convergence towards the LOOP. The panel ADF test (Levin and Lin 1992) takes
advantage of the increased power provided by the panel structure, but these tests
are prone to distortions when the assumption of the mutual independence of the
series does not hold. While solutions have been proposed (see Beck and Weber
2003; and Sosvilla-Rivero and Gil-Pareja 2004), given the dimensions of our data,
we leave this analysis for the future.
13g ε {0, 1} denoting the control and the treatment group, respectively.
14p ε [1..P], where P denotes the total number of product groups used.
15t ε [1..8] for the respective year between 1995 and 2002.
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CVg,p,t = α + β1 · EMU + β2 · post99 + β3 · EMU · post99
+ γ1 · τ + γ2 · τ · EMU + γ3 · τ · post99
+ γ4 · τ · EMU · post99 +
3∑
k=1
δk · Γg,t,k
+
P−1∑
j=1
ηj ·Θj + g,p,t (2)
Control Variables and Product Dummies. The DD method
remains vulnerable to time-varying eﬀects, post-1999, that may in-
ﬂuence price dispersion of EMU members diﬀerently from non-EMU
countries. The inclusion of Γ, the set of control variables, minimizes
any potential bias. The factors that are assumed to vary across time
and group, following Lutz (2003), are
1. the standard deviation of inﬂation rates: to capture (i) diﬀer-
ences in the degree of local-currency pricing across groups and
(ii) the extent to which monetary conditions diﬀer across coun-
tries,16
2. the standard deviation of the growth rate of the nominal dollar
exchange rate: to allow for diﬀerent price movements as a result
of import prices changing and the degree to which incomplete
exchange rate pass-through matters, and
3. the standard deviation of output growth rates: to capture the
degree to which business cycle movements are correlated.
The data for the three control variables are taken from the
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics
database.17
The product ﬁxed eﬀects Θ are included to account for any po-
tential systematic diﬀerences between the product groups: one in
case j=p; otherwise, zero.
16Each of the 161 product groups are individually of small weight in the con-
stitution of the aggregate, economy-wide inﬂation rate.
17The code for the nominal dollar exchange rate is “..AE.ZF..” and the an-
nual average was used. The inﬂation rate is based on the consumer price index
code “..64..ZF..”. Output growth is based on real gross domestic product code
“..99BV..”.
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Interpretation of Coeﬃcients. The coeﬃcient on EMU mea-
sures out the diﬀerence between EMU and non-EMU countries in
price dispersion. The coeﬃcient on post99 measures any step varia-
tion in price dispersion (shared by EMU and non-EMU groups) for
the period after 1999. The coeﬃcient on EMU · post99 measures
any additional diﬀerence in price dispersion among EMU countries,
relative to non-EMU, for the period after 1999.
A similar interpretation applies to the variables consti-
tuted by interacting the time trend with these same dummy
variables.
The eﬀect of the euro is captured by the shift (via EMU ·post99)
and the time-trend break (τ · EMU · post99) in dispersion. Distin-
guishing the shift and time-trend parameters in the model allows us
to gain insight into the process of price convergence. If the intro-
duction of the euro, by lowering arbitrage costs, yields an instanta-
neous adjustment of prices, we expect the shift to be negative and
signiﬁcant. The sticky-price assumption in macroeconomic models
suggests that the shift eﬀect will be muted. However, a structural
break in the time trend (again, negative and signiﬁcant) would be
compatible with the presumption of slow adjustments in the price
process.
Nonlinearity in Dispersion Dynamics. The linear model de-
scribed postulates that the forces brought to bear on price dispersion
by the euro are the same, whether price dispersion is high or low.
However, price convergence is not necessarily a linear function of
price diﬀerences (Matha¨ 2003). It would be plausible to assume that
CPL indices that diverge substantially from 100 would experience a
higher speed of convergence. This is because the pressure from ar-
bitrage could be stronger on these, compared to CPL indices close
to 100. It is just as conceivable that price dispersion may be persis-
tently high for some product groups, while others tend to converge
rapidly.
To take these scenarios into account, we modify equation (2)
to allow for diﬀerential impacts of the euro according to the relative
degree of price dispersion. Dummy variables Q1t, Q2t, Q3t, Q4t mark
out the quartiles into which price dispersion falls for each country
group for each year. We use these dummy variables as categorized in
the previous year (t – 1) and interacted with the time-trend break
in dispersion, as shown in equation (3). The relevant coeﬃcient will
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capture the diﬀerential impact the euro may have on product groups
with high and low price dispersion.
CVg,p,t = α + β1 · EMU + β2 · post99 + β3 · EMU · post99
+ γ1 · τ + γ2 · τ · EMU + γ3 · τ · post99
+ γ4 · τ · EMU · post99 ·Q1t−1
+ γ5 · τ · EMU · post99 ·Q2t−1
+ γ6 · τ · EMU · post99 ·Q3t−1
+ γ7 · τ · EMU · post99 ·Q4t−1
+
3∑
k=1
δk · Γg,t,k +
P−1∑
j=1
ηj ·Θj + g,p,t (3)
3.3.2 Challenges to the Model
Statistical Problems. Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan (2004)
have pointed out a problem in estimating DD models. DD models
estimate the eﬀects of binary treatment on individuals by comparing
before and after outcomes; they typically use many years of data, as
we do, and focus on outcomes that tend to be serially correlated
through time. Serial correlation in the error process can lead to bi-
ased standard error estimates in longer series. Bertrand, Duﬂo, and
Mullainathan (2004) suggest a simulation-based method to overcome
this problem, but its implementation is rather complicated. In esti-
mating our equations we use another solution, and allow arbitrary
covariance structures over time. Using the Huber-White sandwich
estimator of variance and permitting autocorrelation in observations
within product groups is our preferred solution to this problem.
Another purely statistical problem arises because of the diﬀerent
size of the EMU and non-EMU groups: eleven and three countries,
respectively. If, for example, the underlying distribution were nor-
mal, the variance of the EMU group would be distributed χ2(10),18
whereas the variance of the control group would be distributed χ2(2).
That could distort the interpretation of the regression result, since
the dispersion of the variance of the treatment group is greater. This
18The number in brackets indicates the degrees of freedom (ν) of the χ2
probability density function with mean ν and variance 2 · ν.
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Figure 3. The Movement of a Hypothetical National CPL
Across Time
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100 + AC
100 - AC
A B
Source: The diagram is adapted from Wolf (2003, 57).
potential bias is eliminated in our case because the numbers in the
diﬀerent groups are time invariant and the diﬀerence is absorbed by
the EMU dummy along with any other systemic source of diﬀerence
in dispersion between the two groups.
The Constraint for Price Convergence by Arbitrage Cost
(AC). The model faces one other diﬃculty in measuring the euro
eﬀect. Arbitrage only functions as a price-convergence device when
prices lie outside the band of AC. Figure 3 illustrates the movement
of a hypothetical national CPL for an EMU member. The ACs are
shown as a lower and upper band around the EMU average to which
the CPL converges over time.19 Once the CPL is within the band of
AC, arbitrage is no longer proﬁtable. At point A the CPL touches the
AC band, but in an eﬃcient market arbitrageurs step in and reverse
the movement. Membership of EMU can be expected to reduce the
AC range for intra-EMU trade (point B), and this triggers further
convergence until the CPL is within the band again.
19The simplifying assumption in this example is that the EMU average is equal
to the EU average of 100.
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The analysis of the euro eﬀect on price convergence relies on
the fact that the CPL indices are predominately outside the narrow
band at the introduction of the euro as shown in Figure 3. Price
convergence might not be observed if CPL indices are already within
the narrower (post-EMU) range of AC. The model should ideally test
for convergence conditioned on the position of relative prices to the
band of ACs. However, the size of the band is unknown in reality.
4. Estimation
4.1 General Results
Of the 161 product groups for which data is of suﬃciently high qual-
ity, we focused attention on the 115 in the tradable category. As
discussed in section 1, price convergence ought to be most appar-
ent among tradable goods. Our analysis of the forty-six nontrad-
able product groups showed no evidence for a signiﬁcant decline in
price dispersion among EMU countries relative to non-EMU coun-
tries. This remained the case when the analysis was restricted to
the twenty-nine product groups characterized by relatively low sunk
costs.
Following the approach laid out in section 3.3, we begin quantiﬁ-
cation of a potential euro eﬀect by estimating equation (2) across the
115 tradable product groups. The results are presented in column 1
in table 5 in the appendix. The model is estimated with product
ﬁxed eﬀects and employs the robust variance estimator. The relevant
parameters are the shift coeﬃcient (EMU · post99) and the trend
coeﬃcient (τ ·EMU ·post99). The former is insigniﬁcant, though neg-
ative, but the latter is signiﬁcantly negative at the 1 percent level.
As expected, we ﬁnd no instantaneous downward shift in price dis-
persion in the euro zone relative to the non-EMU group, consequent
to the introduction of the euro. But there is evidence of a downward
break in the time trend of price dispersion among EMU countries
relative to non-EMU countries after 1999, supporting the hypothesis
of a euro eﬀect.
We also note that the above patterns are overlaid on a signiﬁcant
negative trend coeﬃcient which suggests price convergence across the
set of all countries (and subgroups of countries, in equations [3] to
[6], discussed below) over the entire 1995–2002 period.
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Figure 4. Price Dispersion Diﬀerence in (Average
Annual) Diﬀerence between the Pre-euro Period and the
Euro Period (EMU and Non-EMU)
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These results are mirrored to a large extent in summary compar-
isons. In 65 percent of our list of tradable product groups, the euro
zone has seen a greater reduction in price dispersion after 1999 than
the non-EMU region.20 In Figure 4 we follow the example of Engel
and Rogers (2004) and present some summary graphical evidence
in support of our regression results. We are interested in capturing,
in a summary way, the evidence of a trend change (rather than a
one-time level change) in price dispersion. We consider year-to-year
changes in the coeﬃcient of variation across the country groups, and
average these changes for the pre-euro period and for the euro period.
20To illustrate with one example, for the product group comprising washing
machines, dryers, and dishwashers, the decline in coeﬃcient of variation of prices
in the euro zone from 20 percent in 1999 to 9 percent in 2002 stands in stark con-
trast to the experience of the non-EMU region, where the coeﬃcient of variation
rose from 7 percent to 8 percent.
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We then take away the euro period average annual change from the
pre-euro period average annual change, and graph these diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences to compare the change in price dispersion in the euro
zone with that in the non-EMU region (in ﬁgure 4 the product groups
are arranged in the ascending order of the gap between the euro
zone and the non-EMU region). Note that the diﬀerence (pre-euro
period – euro period) is generally more positive for the euro zone
than for the non-EMU region, illustrating unconditional trend re-
duction in price dispersion following the launch of the euro.
Over the euro period, the coeﬃcient of variation of CPL, averaged
over tradable product groups, fell by 0.5 percent in the euro zone,
and rose by 1.2 percent in the non-EMU region. These values are not
far from our predictions conditional on the controls in the model—a
fall of 0.4 percent in the euro period in the euro zone and a rise
of 1 percent in the non-EMU region. However, the trends carry the
message—if the trends persist, the diﬀerence between the euro zone
and the non-EMU region in price dispersion will grow to be starkly
evident in just a few years.
4.2 Extracting the Importance of Exchange Rate Risk
EMU incorporates certain exchange rate bands from the preceding
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and not all EMU countries were
similar in terms of intragroup trading risk attributable to exchange
rate variations in the run up to the euro. The ERM was hit by sev-
eral speculative attacks in the aftermath of German reuniﬁcation in
1990 that led to subsequent interest-rate hikes by the Bundesbank in
response to the ﬁscal expansion. “Black Wednesday” (September 16,
1992) marked the expulsion of Britain and Italy from the ERM. Fur-
ther crises in 1993 led to the adoption of wider (±15 percent) bands
for acceptable ﬂuctuations. Only Germany and Netherlands agreed
bilaterally to remain in the original narrower band of ±2.25 per-
cent. Therefore, it could be argued that the exchange rate risk was
substantially lower for the German/Netherlands subgroup (G+NL)
compared with other EMU members before the introduction of the
euro.
Another country grouping that had been in close synchronization
in terms of exchange rates, before EMU (albeit not as closely as
G+NL), is the DM zone comprising Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg,
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Netherlands, and Germany. The exchange rate risk was lower for
these DM-zone countries compared with other EMU members before
the introduction of the euro.
Separate comparisons of the G+NL and the DM zone against
the non-EMU control group should be useful in revealing patterns
in convergence. If exchange rate risk increases arbitrage costs sig-
niﬁcantly, the DM zone trend coeﬃcient should be smaller (more
negative) than the coeﬃcient for the remaining six EMU members.
We should expect the G+NL trend coeﬃcient to be negative and
closer to zero compared to the coeﬃcient for the remaining nine
EMU members, and further, closer to zero than the coeﬃcient for
the DM zone. Indeed this is the pattern found in a comparison of
the trend coeﬃcients in regressions (3) to (6). The null that the co-
eﬃcient of τ ·EMU · post99 is equal for EMU and for the DM zone
is rejected decisively: F (1, 114) = 42.72, p-value close to 0. However,
though the estimate of the coeﬃcient for the DM zone (−0.036) is
lower than the corresponding estimate for the German/Netherlands
group (−0.031), the null that they are equal for the groups cannot
be rejected: F (1, 114) = 1.77, p-value of 0.19.
Overall, these results support the hypothesis that exchange rate
risk is a dominant factor in arbitrage costs.
4.3 Nonlinearity in Dispersion Dynamics
We now relax the assumption of linearity in the eﬀect of arbitrage on
price dispersion. There are two possible ways in which there may be
departures from linearity. One working hypothesis is that the forces
of arbitrage will be stronger on (tradable) products that have higher
degrees of dispersion. A counterhypothesis to this is that tradable
goods may be characterized by diﬀering degrees of “tradability” and
price dispersion may be persistently high in those product groups
that are inherently “less tradable.”
As a ﬁrst step in resolving this issue, we estimate equation (3)
across all tradables. Table 6 in the appendix presents the results.
The coeﬃcients of interest are those on the lagged dispersion quartile
dummy variables Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 interacted with the time-trend
break for the EMU group. If lower arbitrage costs lowered price dis-
persion with greater force for products that had higher degrees of
dispersion, then more negative coeﬃcients will be associated with
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the higher quartiles. The results are the opposite. For EMU, and
subgroups of EMU, the interacted coeﬃcients on the higher quar-
tiles are very signiﬁcantly (almost always at 1 percent) larger (closer
to zero) than those on the lower quartiles.21 The diﬀerentiated pat-
terns in high and low price dispersion product groups seem to be
such that high-dispersion product groups consistently converge less
than low-dispersion product groups.
To explore this further, we examine a select set of broad product
categories to distinguish between the less and more tradable product
groups. For example, food can be separated out into perishable food
products (e.g., bread, fresh ﬁsh, fresh fruit) that are less tradable,
and nonperishable food products (e.g., sugar, coﬀee). It might be ex-
pected that the pressure on prices to converge will be lower for per-
ishable food products than for nonperishable food products. Again,
electrical appliances (e.g., washing machines, ovens, hand tools) are
highly tradable. Alcohol and tobacco products, while highly trad-
able in principle, are marked by country-speciﬁc excise taxes. There
is less reason to expect that reduced arbitrage costs will reduce price
diﬀerences between countries for the latter. Table 7 in the appendix
presents the results for the product groups (table 3) in these broad
categories.
The smaller number of observations at product category level re-
duces the resolution with which patterns emerge. In column 1 the
results for perishable food show that the trend coeﬃcient is not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In contrast, for nonperishable food,
a signiﬁcant (at 10 percent) tendency towards reduced dispersion
can be observed (column 2). Alcohol and tobacco have no signiﬁ-
cant tendency toward reduced price dispersion, while electrical ap-
pliances show a strong convergent tendency (signiﬁcant at 5 percent;
column 4).
5. Conclusion
Our objective was to test the hypothesis that the euro has had a
positive eﬀect on price convergence among EMU members relative
21It was in the case of the DM zone that the pattern was least strong: the co-
eﬃcient on interacted Q3 was lower than that on Q4 at 1 percent, and the coeﬃ-
cient on Q1 was lower than that on Q2 at 5 percent, but Q2 was not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from Q3.
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to non-EMU members. Our ﬁndings suggest that this is true. The
process of convergence in the euro zone triggered by EMU appears
in the form of a structural break in the time trend of price disper-
sion. For EMU, this break accelerates the evident general trend of
reduction in price dispersion across all EU countries after 1995.
Policymakers anticipated declines in price dispersion following
the launch of the euro, but the ﬁrst tranche of academic research
papers on this topic did not ﬁnd evidence of price convergence after
1999, over and above the convergence patterns evident from the early
1990s. Our ﬁnding stands in sharp contrast to this literature, and
would indicate that the euro zone has moved further along in achiev-
ing a single market, relative to EU countries outside the euro zone.
A clearer understanding of the welfare eﬀects of EMU should follow
from examining whether product prices converge to their respective
lowest price in the EMU.
Variations in the ERM history of the EU members permit us to
examine the importance of exchange rate risk for arbitrage costs. We
ﬁnd that the magnitude of the euro eﬀect depends on the extent of
pre-EMU exchange rate risk. It may be interesting to explore whether
diﬀerent expectations of EU members joining the euro in the run up
to the EMU were relevant to the euro eﬀect.
We also ﬁnd clear evidence of diﬀerences among product groups
in their tendencies toward reduced price dispersion. While products
that can be categorized clearly as nontradables show no tendency to-
ward convergence, it is clear that tradable goods diﬀer in their degree
of “tradability,” either because of the nature of the good (perisha-
bility) or because of country-speciﬁc tax diﬀerences that discourage
arbitrage. This may explain why some tradable product categories
display no tendency toward reduced price dispersion.
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Table 3. Selected Product Groups
Food: Perishable
Bread Fresh milk
Other bakery products Preserved milk
Pasta products Other milk products
Other cereal products Cheese
Beef Eggs and egg-based products
Veal Butter
Pork Margarine
Lamb, mutton, and goat Other edible oils and fats
Poultry Fresh or chilled fruit
Other meats and edible oﬀal Fresh or chilled vegetables other
than potatoes
Delicatessen and other meat
preparations
Fresh or chilled potatoes
Fresh or chilled ﬁsh and seafood Frozen vegetables
Frozen ﬁsh and seafood Preserved or processed vegetables
and vegetable-based products
Preserved or processed ﬁsh and
seafood
Edible ice, ice cream, and sorbet
Food: Nonperishable
Flour and other cereals Coﬀee
Dried fruit and nuts Tea and other infusions
Frozen fruit, preserved fruit, and
fruit-based products
Cocoa, excluding cocoa
preparations
Dried vegetables Mineral waters
Sugar Soft drinks and concentrates
Jams, marmalades, and honey Fruit and vegetable juices
Confectionery, chocolate, and other
cocoa preparations
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Table 3 (continued). Selected Product Groups
Alcohol and Tobacco
Spirits Beer
Wine, cider, and perry Cigarettes
Fortiﬁed and sparkling wine Other tobacco products
Electrical Appliances
Refrigerators, freezers, and
fridge-freezers
Small electric accessories
Washing machines, dryers, and
dishwashers
Telephone and telefax equipment
Cookers, hobs, and ovens Television sets and video recorders
Air conditioners, humidiﬁers, and
heaters
Radios, CD players, and other
electro-acoustic devices
Other major household appliances Photographic and cinemato-
graphic equipment and optical
instruments
Small electric household appliances Information processing equipment
Major tools and equipment Electric appliances for personal
care
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Table 4. The National Comparative Price Level (CPL)
Indices Relative to the EU Mean of 100
National CPL
(EU15=100) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Austria 111.8 107.7 103.4 103.4 101.7 99.5 101.2 101.6
Belgium 108.7 105.3 102.3 102.3 102.6 100.3 98.9 98.2
Denmark 132.1 129.8 126.8 126.1 123.5 122.8 123.3 126.1
Finland 115.0 110.6 107.6 106.9 107.3 106.6 107.4 109.8
France 108.7 107.2 102.5 102.1 101.3 99.6 99.0 98.7
Germany 120.8 115.6 111.1 110.6 109.6 106.8 107.4 106.8
Greece 73.4 76.2 78.0 75.9 77.8 75.4 76.4 75.7
Ireland 89.0 91.6 97.0 96.9 100.6 103.8 108.4 109.7
Italy 79.5 87.8 89.8 88.4 88.4 88.0 90.1 91.8
Luxembourg 118.3 115.4 112.3 111.2 107.3 107.6 109.8 110.5
Netherlands 106.9 103.5 99.7 100.1 101.1 100.7 101.1 102.7
Portugal 70.6 71.6 71.2 71.2 70.9 70.8 72.4 73.3
Spain 81.5 83.1 81.2 80.9 80.1 80.8 82.5 82.9
Sweden 113.8 122.2 120.1 117.6 115.8 118.5 111.0 113.9
United Kingdom 84.8 86.2 99.9 103.7 106.8 113.0 110.4 108.4
Source: Eurostat.
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Table 5. Regression Results
DM Zone: EMU Less EMU Less
Treatment Group EMU (A+B+G+L+N) DM Zone G+N G+N
Control Group Non-EMU Non-EMU Non-EMUNon-EMUNon-EMU
Equation 1 2 3 4 5 6
EMU† −0.101 −0.101 −0.139 −0.106 −0.154 −0.103
(3.60)∗∗ (4.92)∗∗ (10.19)∗∗ (3.62)∗∗ (8.98)∗∗ (4.62)∗∗
post1999 −0.004 −0.004 0.006 −0.012 0.002 −0.005
(0.27) (0.38) (0.55) (1.28) (0.20) (0.49)
EMU*post1999 −0.005 −0.005 −0.002 −0.006 −0.011 −0.003
(0.32) (0.41) (0.14) (0.41) (0.75) (0.23)
τ −0.035 −0.035 −0.034 −0.039 −0.03 −0.036
(6.04)∗∗ (7.81)∗∗ (8.08)∗∗ (8.10)∗∗ (8.80)∗∗ (8.05)∗∗
τ *EMU 0.03 0.03 0.029 0.033 0.029 0.031
(3.38)∗∗ (5.15)∗∗ (7.90)∗∗ (4.59)∗∗ (6.46)∗∗ (5.09)∗∗
τ *post1999 0.05 0.05 0.043 0.06 0.036 0.052
(4.07)∗∗ (6.08)∗∗ (6.34)∗∗ (6.40)∗∗ (5.70)∗∗ (6.33)∗∗
τ *EMU*post1999 −0.04 −0.04 −0.036 −0.048 −0.031 −0.042
(2.80)∗∗ (4.30)∗∗ (5.43)∗∗ (4.31)∗∗ (3.91)∗∗ (4.47)∗∗
Std Dev Real GDP 1.316 1.316 0.29 2.325 0.361 1.466
Growth Rate
(2.01)∗ (3.85)∗∗ (2.02)∗ (3.91)∗∗ (1.20) (4.04)∗∗
Std Dev CP Index 1.629 1.629 1.171 2.557 0.13 1.812
Growth Rate
(1.28) (1.94) (1.53) (2.85)∗∗ (0.28) (2.20)∗
Std Dev Real −0.009 −0.009 −0.007 −0.012 −0.004 −0.009
Exchange Rate
(0.39) (0.86) (0.70) (1.18) (0.38) (0.93)
Constant 0.271 0.271 0.284 0.264 0.299 0.271
(8.68)∗∗ (22.99)∗∗ (25.01)∗∗ (21.71)∗∗ (27.31)∗∗ (22.91)∗∗
Product Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eﬀects
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.5 0.52 0.5 0.52
Observations 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840 1840
Estimation Robust Robust, premitting clustering by product groups
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
†The EMU dummy denotes dummy of the treatment group; i.e. the DM zone comprising
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in equation (3) and, relative
to this grouping, the remaining EMU countries in equation (4); Germany and the
Netherlands in equation (5) and, relative to this grouping, remaining EMU countries in
equation (6).
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Table 6. Regression Results: Nonlinearity in Covergence
DM Zone: EMU Less EMU Less
Treatment Group EMU (G+A+B+N+L) DM Zone G+N G+N
Control Group Non-EMU Non-EMU Non-EMU Non-EMU Non-EMU
Equation 1 2 3 4 5
EMU† −0.109 −0.144 −0.107 −0.176 −0.114
(3.87)∗∗ (9.65)∗∗ (3.68)∗∗ (8.23)∗∗ (5.24)∗∗
post1999 −0.002 0.008 −0.011 0.001 −0.002
(0.14) (0.70) (1.19) (0.11) (0.22)
EMU*post1999 −0.007 −0.003 −0.005 −0.014 −0.005
(0.40) (0.24) (0.38) (0.97) (0.40)
τ −0.037 −0.036 −0.038 −0.033 −0.039
(6.17)∗∗ (7.90)∗∗ (7.30)∗∗ (8.22)∗∗ (8.57)∗∗
τ *EMU 0.033 0.031 0.034 0.035 0.034
(3.61)∗∗ (7.54)∗∗ (4.54)∗∗ (6.40)∗∗ (5.71)∗∗
τ *post1999 0.052 0.046 0.058 0.04 0.055
(4.18)∗∗ (6.53)∗∗ (5.96)∗∗ (5.96)∗∗ (6.77)∗∗
τ *EMU*post1999*Q1 −0.056 −0.049 −0.067 −0.05 −0.061
(3.89)∗∗ (7.03)∗∗ (6.04)∗∗ (5.88)∗∗ (6.73)∗∗
τ *EMU*post1999*Q2 −0.05 −0.045 −0.053 −0.044 −0.053
(3.49)∗∗ (6.70)∗∗ (4.84)∗∗ (5.11)∗∗ (5.73)∗∗
τ *EMU*post1999*Q3 −0.04 −0.039 −0.046 −0.035 −0.044
(2.76)∗∗ (5.61)∗∗ (4.35)∗∗ (4.07)∗∗ (4.82)∗∗
τ *EMU*post1999*Q4 −0.024 −0.02 −0.024 −0.015 −0.024
(1.65) (2.83)∗∗ (1.85) (1.50) (2.42)*
Std Dev Real GDP 1.247 0.26 2.204 0.585 1.4
Growth Rate
(1.99)∗ (1.92) (3.69)∗∗ (1.45) (4.08)∗∗
Std Dev CP Index 1.547 1.241 2.267 0.005 1.788
Growth Rate
(1.22) (1.66) (2.41)∗ (0.01) (2.18)∗
Std Dev Real Exchange −0.009 −0.008 −0.011 −0.005 −0.01
Rate
(0.41) (0.79) (1.10) (0.46) (1.02)
Constant 0.284 0.296 0.271 0.303 0.287
(9.19)∗∗ (22.97)∗∗ (19.61)∗∗ (22.50)∗∗ (21.73)∗∗
Product Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.55 0.52 0.56 0.52 0.56
Observations 1786 1791 1767 1738 1795
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
†See table 1 for intrepretation of the EMU dummy.
All equations have been estimated with robust variance estimator, allowing for clustering by
product group.
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Table 7. Regression Results: Selected Product
Groups
Perishable Nonperishable Alcohol and Electrical
Food food Tobacco Appliances
Equation 1 3 5 7
EMU −0.053 −0.158 0.106 −0.218
(1.51) (2.28)* (2.28)+ (5.40)**
post1999 −0.013 0.006 0.007 0.012
(0.83) (0.20) (0.21) (0.52)
EMU*post1999 0 −0.038 −0.074 0.01
(0.01) (0.77) (1.56) (0.41)
τ −0.02 −0.038 −0.011 −0.064
(3.26)** (3.52)** (0.87) (5.33)**
τ *EMU 0.012 0.043 0.01 0.056
(1.28) (2.55)* (0.79) (3.59)**
τ *post1999 0.014 0.037 0.022 0.085
(1.18) (3.32)** (1.43) (2.52)*
τ *EMU*post1999 0.001 −0.031 0.004 −0.081
(0.08) (1.91)+ (0.18) (2.19)*
Std Dev Real GDP 0.442 1.963 2.096 2.934
Growth Rate
(0.76) (1.85)+ (1.16) (4.01)**
Std Dev CP Index −1.207 2.034 1.644 3.719
Growth Rate
(0.72) (0.62) (0.45) (1.56)
Std Dev Real 0.006 0.018 −0.019 0.035
Exchange Rate
(0.60) (1.13) (0.78) (0.81)
Constant 0.289 0.21 0.268 0.322
(11.71)** (6.46)** (3.69)* (19.34)**
Product Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.4 0.53 0.67 0.48
Observations 448 224 96 224
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; + signiﬁcant at 10%; * signiﬁcant at 5%;
** signiﬁcant at 1%.
In all equations, the treatment group is EMU and the control group comprises the
non-EMU countries.
All equations have been estimated with robust variance estimator, and allowing for
auto-correlation within product group.
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